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Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 
Asylees in Wonderland: A New Procedural 
Perspective on America’s Asylum System 
 
Eliot Walker 
“But I don’t want to go among mad people,” Alice remarked. 
“Oh, you can’t help that,” said the Cat: “we’re all mad here.  I’m mad.  
You’re mad.” 
“How do you know I’m mad?” said Alice. 
“You must be,” said the Cat, “or you wouldn’t have come here.”1
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Persons seeking asylum in the United States must, like Alice, descend into a world 
of rules, standards, and characters that seem increasingly mad.  Before the asylum seeker 
lies a land of promise, held out by international human rights standards established a half-
century ago.2  Behind the asylum seeker looms the memory and prospect of persecutions 
of the most horrible varieties.  But in between that promised land and memory is a 
wonderland of arbitrary processes the asylum seeker cannot possibly understand. 
¶2 The decline of confidence in American asylum adjudication is now front-page 
material for major mainstream newspapers.3  The tide of resentment has been buoyed 
primarily by words from the federal judiciary.  Judge Julio Fuentes, of the Third Circuit, 
recently condemned “the tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm” of one 
immigration judge to be “more appropriate to a court television show than a federal court 
proceeding.”4  Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner broadly declared that “the 
adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum 
standards of legal justice.”5  Other courts, similarly, have voiced concern over whether 
the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (BIA) streamlining process has transformed the BIA 
into a rubber-stamp machine.6  Finally, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales himself 
acknowledged the concerns.7  In memoranda issued to both immigration judges and the 
                                                 
1 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 51 (Donald J. Gray ed., Norton Critical 2d ed. 1992) (1865). 
2 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6260, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
3 See Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1. 
4 Wang v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (reprimanding Immigration Judge 
Annie S. Garcy). 
5 See id. (quoting Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
6 See, e.g., Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 331 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing that the BIA “may have 
shirked its role and duty of ensuring that the final agency determination in an immigration case is 
reasonably sound and current”).  Former BIA Judge Lory Rosenberg has also voiced the concern, stating 
“[w]hen the BIA had a more active role, it would clean up decisions . . . . Now the BIA is a rubber stamp.”  
Pamela MacLean, Immigration Bench Plagued by Flaws, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 6, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter 
MacLean, Immigration Bench]. 
7 See Memorandum of Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, to Immigration Judges (Jan. 9, 2006), 
available at http://www.immigration.com/newsletter1/attgenimmjudge.pdf; Memorandum of Alberto 
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BIA, Gonzales conceded that a “comprehensive review of the immigration courts” is in 
order.8 
¶3 That the American asylum system has fallen into disrepute is no longer a 
significantly contested point of debate.  What is less understood, however, is exactly why 
and how the system fell so far.  This paper delves into that question, and argues that 
meaningful reform of the U.S. asylum system must step back and consider the system’s 
very structure.9  Meaningless evidentiary standards combine with minimal administrative 
and judicial review to result in a system that simply shrugs off material errors.  Effective 
reform must go beyond token quick-fix gestures and instead adopt a new perspective that 
recognizes that the real problems are systemic. 
¶4 The following sections analyze major procedural pitfalls the asylum seeker must 
navigate in American immigration courts.  Upon review of the system and the recent 
responses it has engendered, this paper proposes new perspectives on reforming U.S. 
asylum adjudication.  The proposals do not attempt a comprehensive prescription for U.S. 
asylum reform—that massive undertaking is left to other writings—but instead offers 
some alternative perspectives on how to reorient a system gone astray. 
II. DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE: PROCEDURAL PITFALLS OF U.S. ASYLUM DETERMINATIONS 
A. At the Border: Expedited Removal 
¶5 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA)10 marked a major shift in the United States’s treatment of non-citizens at our 
borders.11  In the asylum context, Congress removed many asylum determinations from 
the judicial process entirely and replaced them with point-of-entry “expedited removal” 
determinations by asylum officers.12  Under this procedure, arriving asylum applicants 
must convince an asylum officer that they have a “credible fear of persecution.”13  
Notably, a credible fear determination entails not only determining that the applicant is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, to Members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Jan. 9, 2006), 
available at http://www.immigration.com/newsletter1/attgenmembia.pdf. 
8 See sources cited supra note 7.  The review has recently concluded.  Press Release, Department of Justice, 
Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration 
Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html.  These 
new reforms were published after this article’s submission and are therefore not addressed in full here.  The 
reforms, as noted infra Parts II.D & III.A, also do not consider the procedural issues that are the focus of 
this article.  The article has been updated, however, where appropriate. 
9 The view is not uncontested.  Even Judge Posner’s scathing opinion in Benslimane states that its criticism 
is “not due to judicial hostility to the nation’s immigration policies.” 430 F.3d at 829-30.  Similarly, 
Gonzales’s memos to immigration judges and the BIA narrowly address personnel problems of 
“intemperate or even abusive” judges, without regard to the system itself.  See sources cited, supra note 7. 
10 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
11 See generally 1 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND PROCEDURE § 2.04 (2005) [hereinafter GORDON ET AL.] (reviewing legislative history after 1952 and 
noting that the IIRIRA “wrought a major reconfiguring of the immigration law”); IRA KURZBAN, 
IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 9 (8th ed. 2003) (reviewing the IIRIRA’s “new and far reaching grounds 
of inadmissibility”); PHILIP SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO SAVE 
POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 225 (2000) (surveying the anti-immigrant political climate precipitating 
the IIRIRA). 
12 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2000). 
13 Id.  For a fuller review and discussion of expedited removal in the asylum context, see 3 GORDON ET AL., 
supra note 11, § 34.02. 
2 
Vol. 2:1] Eliot Walker 
“credible” in the colloquial sense of the word, but further that the applicant has a 
“significant possibility” of ultimately gaining asylum.14  Should the applicant fail to 
convince the asylum officer that his or her fear is credible, the applicant is immediately 
removed from the United States.15  The federal courts have no jurisdiction to review the 
officers’ decisions.16 
¶6 The shift of authority over asylum determinations from immigration courts to 
asylum officers is easily criticized.17  By removing credibility determinations from 
trained immigration judges, asylum seekers subject to expedited removal are quite 
literally at the whim of whichever officer happens to stand at the border.  Immigration 
officers at this phase can decide an asylum seeker’s fate completely free from the 
strictures of formal proceedings or judicial review.18  Reports consistently—and 
unfortunately—reveal that the officers have abused this discretion.  In one case, 
immigration officials injured a refugee as they were attempting to remove him; the 
refugee was then returned to the airport, re-interviewed by different officers, and found to 
have a credible fear of persecution for his political beliefs in Guinea, where he had been 
tortured.19  A bipartisan study by the United States Commission on International 
Religious Freedom concludes that “the outcome of an asylum claim appears to depend 
not only on the strength of the claim, but also on which officials consider the claim, and 
whether or not the alien has an attorney.”20  From the outset, the fate of an asylum seeker 
at the U.S. border may be less dependent on a measured consideration of facts than on 
hope and chance. 
B. Into Immigration Court: Asylum Hearings 
¶7 If the asylum seeker succeeds in making it past expedited removal, the applicant 
must present his or her claim in full before an immigration judge.  This asylum hearing 
affords the asylum seeker an expanded opportunity to tell his or her story.  Even here, 
however, the system is mired with subjectivity and a lack of accountability.21  Three 
                                                 
14 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).  For a closer look at expedited removal and the problems it entails, see 
generally CARRIE DAVENPORT, A “BRUTAL NEED”: HOW THE APPLICATION OF EXPEDITED REMOVAL TO 
POTENTIAL REFUGEES VIOLATES THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 8 (2005), available at 
http://www.ailf.org/awards/dubroff_2005.pdf (noting that requiring the asylum officer to make an 
unreviewable determination of the applicant’s likelihood of success, based on present law, retards the 
advancement of U.S. asylum doctrine). 
15 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
16 Id.  The applicant’s adverse credibility determination may be administratively reviewed, however, upon 
request by an immigration judge.  Id.; 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 34.02[3][a]. 
17 See, e.g., DAVENPORT, supra note 14; U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 
REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 50 (2005), available at 
http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylum_refugees/2005/february [hereinafter USCIRF REPORT]; Eric 
Schmitt, When Asylum Requests Are Overlooked, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2001, at A16. 
18 See generally 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 34.02. 
19 Susan Sachs, I.N.S. Inspectors Are Judge, Jury and Deporter, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2000, at 
B5. 
20 See USCIRF REPORT, supra note 17, at 4. 
21 See, e.g., Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 2004) (surveying the Circuit Courts’ “concern 
about the immigration service’s chronic overreliance on [State Department] reports”); Marcu v. INS, 147 
F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 1998) (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (lamenting the INS’s success in denying an 
asylum claim by relying exclusively upon State Department reports); Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 
324 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting, among other things, that “the [immigration judge’s] comments are not tethered 
to the record, owing what little support they have to hyperbole and appeals to popular culture—two utterly 
3 
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problems distinguish themselves significantly.  First, immigration judges have afforded 
the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices wildly varying 
degrees of deference.22  In the most extreme cases, the BIA has upheld asylum denials by 
relying exclusively upon generalized and conclusory State Department human rights 
reports as dispositive rejections of the asylum applicant’s admittedly credible personal 
testimony.23  Second, legislative reforms have increasingly shifted the burden of 
persuasion to the asylum seeker, in derogation of foundational norms of refugee law.24  
Third, the federal circuit courts have also personally called out immigration judges for 
simply unprofessional conduct.25  The following sections review these problems and the 
legal framework that tolerates them. 
1. Reliance on Country Conditions Reports: Abdicating Adjudicatory Responsibility 
¶8 An applicant for asylum to the United States must prove that he or she has a well-
founded fear of persecution in his or her country of origin.26  To establish that the 
applicant’s fear is well-founded, the applicant must show “that a reasonable person in his 
                                                                                                                                                 
inappropriate bases for an asylum decision”); see also Susan Kerns, Note, Country Conditions 
Documentation in U.S. Asylum Cases: Leveling the Evidentiary Playing Field, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 197, 197 (2000) (“United States immigration courts have tended to rely selectively, without reasoned 
analysis, on information bits that are decontextualized from what is known about a country of origin from 
the record as a whole.”); Peter Margulies, Democratic Transitions and the Future of Asylum Law, 71 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 3, 3 (2000) (surveying the dissolution of procedural safeguards in asylum proceedings and 
pronouncing that “[t]he United States’s commitment to protecting refugees is dying a slow death”). 
22 See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/c1470.htm (last visited 
May 24, 2007). 
23 See, e.g., Manzoor v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 254 F.3d 342, 348 (1st Cir. 2001) (vacating the BIA’s 
decision and reminding that “it is the Attorney General, not the Secretary of State, whom Congress has 
entrusted with the authority to grant asylum and because ‘there is perennial concern that the [State] 
Department softpedals human rights violations by countries that the United States wants to have good 
relations with.’” (quoting Gramatikov v. INS, 128 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 1997)); Marcu, 147 F.3d at 1086 
(Hawkins, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s opinion allows the BIA to abdicate its fact-finding function by 
merely including a few citations and pithy quotes from the [State Department] country report in its 
analysis.”). 
24 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), HANDBOOK ON 
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS ¶ 196 (rev. ed. 1992), available at 
http://www.asylumsupport.info/publications/unhcr/handbook.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK] 
(explaining the asylum seeker’s common difficulty of preserving evidence during his or her persecution, 
and the resultant obligation of the adjudicator to assist in factfinding and provide the applicant “the benefit 
of the doubt”); see generally 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 34.02[9][A]. 
25 See, e.g., Wang v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 423 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2005) (“A disturbing 
pattern of immigration judge misconduct has emerged notwithstanding the fact that some of our sister 
circuits have repeatedly echoed our concerns.”); Pamela A. MacLean, Immigration Judges Come under 
Fire, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 30, 2006 [hereinafter MacLean, Immigration Judges] (surveying various cases of 
abuse of asylum seekers by immigration judges). 
26 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2000).  The “well-founded fear” standard should not be confused with the “credible 
fear” standard used at initial asylum interviews.  To show a credible fear, an asylum seeker must 
demonstrate “that there is a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements 
made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the 
alien could establish eligibility for asylum under section 208.”  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).  If the 
applicant demonstrates a credible fear, the applicant must then show at his or her asylum hearing that the 
fear is well-founded and on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).  For a fuller discussion of the use of these standards 
and asylum procedures generally, see generally 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 34.02. 
4 
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circumstances would fear persecution.”27  An applicant who demonstrates past 
persecution is afforded a presumptive well-founded fear of future persecution.28  The 
government may rebut this presumption, however, if it can show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the applicant’s home country conditions have changed or that the 
applicant could avoid persecution by relocating within his or her home country.29  In any 
case, the applicant’s claim “cannot . . . be considered in the abstract, and must be viewed 
in the context of the relevant background situation.”30  Country conditions reports, 
therefore, regularly play a central role in substantiating the objective reasonableness of an 
applicant’s subjective fear of persecution.31 
¶9 Country conditions reports also play an important role in the immigration judge’s 
credibility determination of the applicant.  An asylum applicant’s testimony sustains the 
applicant’s burden only where the immigration judge is satisfied that the applicant is 
credible.32  In making a credibility determination, the immigration judge may require the 
applicant to provide corroborating evidence, including country condition reports relevant 
to the applicant’s claim.33  In practice, moreover, the BIA holds that “general background 
information about a country, where available, must be included in the record as a 
foundation for the applicant’s claim.”34  Should the applicant fail to provide such 
background information, the applicant must offer an explanation for its absence.35 
¶10 An anonymous State Department report announcing to a bona fide asylum seeker 
that his or her testimony is no longer valid is indeed a difficult pill for the asylum seeker 
to swallow.  Country conditions reports, regardless of their comprehensiveness or 
veracity, may be fatal to an asylum application where those reports contradict the asylum 
seeker in virtually any way.36  While circuit courts have regularly held that generalized 
country condition reports are insufficient to rebut a presumption of well-founded fear 
based on past persecution,37 near total deference to State Department reports is not 
uncommon in asylum decisions.38  As the Seventh Circuit recently lamented, the 
                                                 
27 In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 
(1987) (rejecting the BIA’s then-position that the “well-founded fear” requirement requires a “more likely 
than not” determination of future persecution, and instituting the current and less stringent “reasonable 
possibility” standard). 
28 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2006). 
29 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i). 
30 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 42. 
31 See Kerns, supra note 21, at 197 (“Documentation related to a country’s political situation and human 
rights record is relevant, and often crucial, evidence regarding the objective reasonableness of an asylum 
seeker’s subjective fear of persecution.”). 
32 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
33 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
34 In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724 (BIA 1997) (emphasis added). 
35 Id.  But see 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 34.02[9][c][ii] (juxtaposing the BIA approach with the 
more relaxed approach of the Ninth Circuit). 
36 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (“a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency 
of [the applicant’s] statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of 
State on country conditions)”); 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (“In deciding an asylum application, or in deciding 
whether the alien has a credible fear of persecution . . . the asylum officer may rely on material provided by 
the Department of State . . . .”); Kerns, supra note 21, at 202.  See also infra notes 62-63 (discussing REAL 
ID Act). 
37 See, e.g. Manzoor v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 254 F.3d 342, 347 (1st Cir. 2001) (reversing BIA’s denial of 
asylum where BIA relied exclusively on a State Department report about lack of countrywide persecution); 
KURZBAN, supra note 11, at 301 (surveying many similar cases). 
38 See, e.g. Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding a BIA decision relying entirely upon 
5 
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immigration courts are plagued by “chronic overreliance on [State Department] 
reports.”39 
¶11 The substantive reliability of State Department reports has also been a focus of 
circuit court disapproval for some time.  In the oft-cited decision of Gramatikov v. INS,40 
Judge Richard Posner wrote: “[T]here is a perennial concern that the Department 
softpedals human rights violations by countries that the United States wants to have good 
relations with.”41  This concern, although difficult to substantiate conclusively, has been 
frequently reiterated in academic circles.42  Empirical studies, for example, have shown 
historically greater asylum acceptance rates from communist countries than from other 
countries that are less politically hostile to the United States.43  These concerns, 
unfortunately, seem to echo indeterminably throughout the circuit courts without much 
consequence.44  Notwithstanding complaints, immigration judges continue to rely on 
State Department reports without any formal restraints.45 
¶12 When the immigration courts treat State Department reports as “holy writs,” they 
are prone to making leaps of faith lacking reasoned or particularized analysis.46  
Immigration judges, as the critics charge, “selectively use individual pieces of country 
conditions information without regard to the nature of that information or how those 
‘pieces’ relate to the record as a whole.”47  State Department reports are, by nature, only 
                                                                                                                                                 
the State Department’s report).  The Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL), of the Department of Justice, 
has reassured in its own bulletin that “no court has held that State Department reports do not constitute 
substantial evidence.”  John Cunningham, The Evidentiary Status of State Department Reports in Asylum 
Cases, IMMIGRATION LITIGATION BULLETIN, Dec. 31, 2004, at 5-6 (noting also a “fundamental principle—
that the court gives great weight to State Department reports because they concern matters within that 
agency’s area of expertise”).  See also Margulies, supra note 21, at 17 (“Many recent decisions defer 
mechanically to State Department conclusions citing the results of single elections or changes in law ‘on 
the books’ as proof that refugees have nothing to fear.”). 
39 Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 2004).  Judge Posner noted further concern that “the 
authors of these reports are anonymous and there is no opportunity for the asylum-seeker to cross-examine 
any of them.”  Id. (citing Gailius v. INS, 147, F.3d 34, 46 n.7 (1st Cir. 1998)). 
40 128 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 1997). 
41 Id. 
42 See Margulies, supra note 21, at 4 n.4 (surveying the literature); David Martin, Reforming Asylum 
Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1331 (1990). 
43 Martin, supra note 42, at 1331. (“[E]ven a quick glance at the statistics in Table II raises serious 
questions about the high grant rates for [asylum] applicants from communist countries… and the strikingly 
low rates for El Salvador and Guatemala.”). 
44 See, e.g., Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he immigration court cannot assume that a 
report produced by the State Department—an agency of the Executive Branch of Government that is 
necessarily bound to be concerned to avoid abrading relations with other countries, especially other major 
world powers—presents the most accurate picture of human rights in the country at issue.”); Shah v. INS, 
220 F.3d 1062, 1069 - 70 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gramatikov v. INS, 128 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 1997)); 
Gailius v. INS, 147 F.3d 34, 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (same); see also Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 
2000) (“The country report is evidence and sometimes the only evidence available, but the [BIA] should 
treat it with a healthy skepticism, rather than, as is its tendency, as Holy Writ.”). 
45 See Kerns, supra note 21, at 197 (“No mechanism exists . . . to assure fundamental fairness in how 
country conditions information is utilized in the decision-making process.”); Cunningham, supra note 38, 
at 5 (OIL officer dismissing Gramatikov’s concern as “dicta in the purest sense,” and continuing to 
advocate reliance upon State Department reports). 
46 Galina, 213 F.3d at 959. 
47 See Kerns, supra note 21, at 215.  See also Galina, 213 F.3d at 959 (“The [BIA’s] worst error, a rather 
astounding lapse of logic, remains to be mentioned.  The [BIA] relied on the 1998 country condition report 
to show that the persecution by the Greens that drove Galina and her husband out of Latvia in 1994 is 
unlikely to recur.  But we cannot find anything in the report that bears on that question.”); Margulies, supra 
6 
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generalized summaries of recent country conditions.48  Replacing particularized fact-
finding with generalized reports puts the reports to a task they are poorly suited for,49 
regardless of their veracity, and further implicitly presumes that the applicant’s testimony 
is not credible.  Foisting such a burden on the asylum seeker, who is generally without 
substantial means in the first place, violates international refugee standards as 
incorporated into U.S. law.50  By careless deference to the reports, the immigration courts 
abdicate their fact-finding responsibilities to the State Department.51  For those seeking 
asylum from persecution, the result is a cold “jurisprudence of impatience.”52 
2. Shifting the Burden of Persuasion: Overturning the Foundations of Asylum Law 
¶13 Although asylum applicants bear the ultimate burden of proof, asylum law 
recognizes the unique circumstances of asylum seekers and the resultant difficulties they 
may have in presenting their cases.53  Asylum seekers can be expected to have difficulty 
speaking about traumatic events54 or even trusting U.S. authorities.55  The immigration 
court, moreover, almost always has significantly better resources than the applicant to 
obtain much of the background evidence.56  As the Second Circuit has put it, “a genuine 
refugee does not flee her native country armed with affidavits, expert witnesses, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
note 21, at 17. 
48 See generally U.S. Department of State, Country Reports, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/c1470.htm (last 
visited May 24, 2007); Margulies, supra note 21, at 34 (“[S]tate Department reports are wholly 
unsystematic in their approach.  At best, these reports amount to a grab bag of facts offering little insight 
into the risks faced by returning refugees.  At worst, they offer an apologia for human rights abuses that is 
driven by U.S. foreign policy concerns rather than the safety of refugees.”). 
49 This is commonly deemed the “legislative/adjudicative” factual distinction, and is explored in full in 
David Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
1247, 1280 (1990). 
50 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 196 (explaining the oft-stated principle that the asylum 
seeker’s lack of resources warrants affording him or her “the benefit of the doubt”).  The U.S. Refugee Act 
of 1980 brought the United States into compliance with international refugee standards as embodied under 
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which the United States acceded to in 
1968.  U.S. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980); Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1968) 
[hereinafter Refugee Protocol]; see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-437 (1987) (“If one thing 
is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is 
that one of Congress’s primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . .”).  The Refugee Protocol also incorporates articles 
two through thirty-four of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, in 
addition to its definition of “refugee” in article I.  Refugee Protocol at art. I; Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 
Refugee Convention]. 
51 Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that “it was improper for the BIA to rely on the 
State Department’s opinion in finding the [petitioner] not credible ‘because it is the Attorney General, not 
the Secretary of State, whom Congress has entrusted with the authority to grant asylum’” (quoting Gailius 
v. INS, 147 F.3d 34, 46 (1st Cir. 1998))). 
52 Margulies, supra note 21, at 19. 
53 See 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 34.02(9)(d). 
54 See, e.g., Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 411 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2005), reviewed infra Part II.B.iii. 
55 See, e.g., Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Given [the applicant’s] allegations of 
torture and detention, he may well have been reluctant to disclose the breadth of his suffering in Sri Lanka 
to a government official upon arriving in the United States . . . .”). 
56 Yang v. McElroy, 277 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The INS not only has [the burden of production] 
but also has greater access than does the alien—even an alien represented by counsel—to State Department 
documents and other sources of current data.”) (citation omitted). 
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extensive documentation.”57  Given these considerations, international standards 
incorporated into U.S. law state both that the asylum applicant is to “be given the benefit 
of the doubt” and that “the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared 
between the applicant and the examiner.”58 
¶14 While the law’s expression of sympathy for asylum seekers may be seen as a false 
promise,59 recent legislative amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
have removed the promise altogether.  The 2005 REAL ID Act’s sweeping evisceration 
of procedural safeguards is alarming.60  Among other things, the REAL ID Act requires 
asylum seekers to prove one “central reason” of their persecution.61  Prior case law, in 
consideration of the asylum seeker’s aforementioned evidentiary difficulties, required 
only that the asylum seeker demonstrate one of his or her persecutor’s motives.  This was 
especially relevant in so-called “mixed motive” cases, where it was deemed unreasonable 
to expect the asylum seeker to essentially present his or her persecutor with a note asking, 
“are you primarily persecuting me on account of race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion, or membership in a particular social group, or do you have multiple or secondary 
reasons in mind?”  The silver lining for asylum seekers is that the new requirement is so 
patently absurd and unworkable that it will likely be ignored in practice. 
¶15 Other provisions of the REAL ID Act are similarly troubling.  The act expressly 
invites immigration judges to base their credibility determinations not only on the internal 
consistency of the applicant’s testimony—which may itself be difficult for reasons of 
translation or trauma, among others—but also on consistency with State Department 
reports.62  An asylum seeker may suffer an adverse credibility determination simply for 
asserting a claim contrary to a State Department report, regardless of the materiality of 
the inconsistency.63  The choice this can present to the asylum seeker is dizzying: either 
express the truth and risk a discretionary adverse credibility determination for 
inconsistency with a bureaucratic report, or lie for consistency’s sake but risk losing 
one’s claim for reason of fraudulent testimony. 
¶16 The problems of the REAL ID Act go on, but the sentiment behind the amendments 
is consistent: asylum seekers must not be trusted.  Even assuming arguendo that such 
xenophobia is warranted, a solution logically suited to the concern would attempt to 
discern between meritorious and non-meritorious asylum claims.  A requirement that 
asylum seekers prove the central motive of their persecutor presents an obstacle that 
would be insurmountable for all asylum seekers, regardless of the merit of their claims.  
Such an imposition is not only cruel, not only arbitrary, but also increases the likelihood 
that bona fide refugees will be returned to countries where they will be persecuted, 
                                                 
57 Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir. 1999); see generally Virgil Wiebe et al., Asking for a Note 
from Your Torturer: Corroboration and Authentication Requirements in Asylum, Withholding and Torture 
Convention Claims, 01-10 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (Oct. 2001). 
58 In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 725, 729 (BIA 1997) (quoting UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 
196); Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he [immigration judge] has an 
affirmative obligation to help establish and develop the record in the course of [asylum] proceedings.”); see 
also sources cited supra note 50 (explaining how the U.S. 1980 Refugee Act was intended to bring U.S. 
refugee law into conformance with international standards). 
59 See infra Part I.B.3 (reviewing judicial misconduct and bias against asylum seekers in asylum hearings). 
60 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). 
61 Id. § 101(a)(3)(B)(i). 
62 Id. § 101(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
63 Id. 
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tortured, or even killed.  By doing so, the United States violates its commitments under 
both domestic64 and international law.65 
3. Abusing the Persecuted: Immigration Judges and Misconduct 
¶17 To accuse a “jurisprudence of impatience” or lament the deterioration of refugee 
law is one thing.  To outright call into question the competence of a specific judge is 
another.  Yet time and time again, the federal courts have found themselves forced to do 
just that.66  These criticisms focus not on evidentiary standards specifically, but rather on 
a professional concern that immigration judges and the BIA may care more about 
clearing their dockets than the asylum applicants before them.67  Indeed, reports suggest 
that immigration judges and the BIA may have even consciously strayed from their 
responsibilities as neutral arbiters in asylum proceedings.68  Considering the stakes at 
hand for asylum seekers, such cavalier abuses of authority deserve rebuke for more than 
academic purposes. 
¶18 Examining a particular example of how an immigration judge can abuse authority 
illustrates the problem.  In Fiadjoe v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, a Third Circuit 
decision, a Ghanaian asylum applicant alleged that her father enslaved and began raping 
her at age seven.69  When the applicant fell in love and conceived a child with a Muslim 
man, her father beat her until she had a miscarriage.70  When the man came to her home, 
her father beat him to death in front of the applicant.71  When the applicant eventually 
came to the United States, a psychologist found that she struggled to communicate or 
make any eye contact, and frequently dissociated due to her emotional trauma.72  At her 
asylum hearing, the applicant broke down and cried while attempting to testify about her 
abuse.73  The following exchange between Immigration Judge Donald V. Ferlise and the 
applicant was typical of the entire hearing: 
                                                 
64 INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(3) (2006) (codifying the principle of non-refoulement); see also 
sources cited supra note 50. 
65 See sources cited supra note 50. 
66 See, e.g., Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The immigration judge’s analysis was so 
inadequate as to raise questions of adjudicative competence.”); Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 331 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (“The decision here on review is neither [reasonably sound nor reasonably current], and it is an 
embarrassment to the Agency on multiple levels.”); Wang v. Att’y  Gen. of the United States, 423 F.3d 
260, 267 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Time and time again, we have cautioned immigration judges against making 
intemperate or humiliating remarks during immigration proceedings.”); MacLean, Immigration Judges, 
supra note 25 (“There are judges who really have no business being judges.  They are unfit and should be 
removed.”) (quoting immigration attorney and scholar Ira Kurzban). 
67 See, e.g. Berishaj, 378 F.3d at 331 (stating that the “natural—though surely unintended—consequence of 
the streamlining regulations” is summary affirmances that suggest the BIA has shirked its duties). 
68 See Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (“[N]o person [may] be deprived of his interests in the 
absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed 
to find against him.”); Wang, 423 F.3d at 267-271 (surveying various instances of aggressive and patently 
biased brow-beating by immigration judges); see generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the 
War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369 (2006) (discussing and criticizing Attorney General John 
Ashcroft’s allegedly conscious efforts to bias immigration judges) [hereinafter Legomsky, Deportation]. 
69 411 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 2005) (describing further how the abuse was part of local religious rituals, 
thus giving rise to her asylum claim). 
70 Id. at 140. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 141. 
73 Id. at 142-143. 
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Ferlise:  Ma’am, you, you can cry, that’s fine, but you’re not making 
any sense, and the tears do not do away with the fact that you’re not 
making any sense to me.  Now, rather than crying, just answer the 
question.  You said, your father raped you at age seven and he would beat 
you, correct? 
Fiadjoe: Yes, but I didn’t tell anybody. 
Ferlise: I don’t care if you did or not.  At age seven, how long did 
this go on that he was raping you and beating you? 
Fiadjoe: In fact, he was doing that to me when I cried to my auntie, I 
want to— 
Ferlise:  —Ma’am, I don’t like it when someone beats around the 
bush, okay, when they don’t answer me.74
¶19 The Third Circuit found that Ferlise’s adverse credibility determination was not 
supported by substantial evidence, and on remand he was removed from the case.75 
¶20 Instances like this might be regarded as mere unfortunate errors if they were 
isolated, corrected, and the abusive immigration judges ferreted out.  Astonishingly, 
however, Fiadjoe is not atypical.  Not only has the Third Circuit recently found Judge 
Ferlise to be improperly abusive in yet another case,76 but his reckless attitude is evident 
in numerous other asylum determinations reviewed by the federal courts of appeal.  As a 
study by the National Law Journal determined, “[a]t least 25 appellate opinions have 
criticized immigration judges’ treatment of aliens during deportation and asylum hearings 
since 2003.  In 13 of those cases, the panels found the conduct so egregious that they said 
the case should be assigned to a new judge.”77  The circuit courts have likewise surveyed 
the widespread nature of the abuse.  In Benslimane v. Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit 
opened its decision by string-citing twelve cases of administrative incompetence, en route 
to declaring that “adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below 
the minimum standards of legal justice.”78  Immigration lawyers, for their part, have 
                                                 
74 Id.   
75 Id.  The Third Circuit decision reprints many such exchanges contained in the transcript, which are also 
worth review.  In a subsequent different asylum case, the Third Circuit again reversed Immigration Judge 
Donald Ferlise’s adverse credibility determination as wholly unsupported, and advised the BIA to assign 
the case to a different judge.  Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627 (3d Cir. 2006).  In that case, Ferlise 
rebuked the applicant’s testimony on cross-examination regarding her sister’s desire to find a better job: 
“Look for a better job.  Ma’am she has no right to be here.  You have no right to be here.  All of the 
applicants that are applying for asylum have no right to be here. . . . You have to understand, the whole 
world does not revolve around you and the other Indonesians . . . . It’s not a world that revolves around you 
and your ethnic group.”  Id at 638. (quoting asylum hearing transcript). The Third Circuit reflected “[w]e 
are deeply troubled by the [immigration judge]’s remarks, none of which had any basis in the facts 
introduced, or the arguments made, at the hearing. . . . This is not the first time we have been troubled by 
the conduct of [this immigration judge].” Id. at 638 & n.11. 
76 See Sukwanputra, 434 F.3d at 638. 
77 MacLean, Immigration Bench, supra note 6. 
78 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005).  Note further that Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has himself 
acknowledged the concern.  See sources cited supra note 7. 
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further complained that some immigration judges manipulate the court record by turning 
the recording machine on and off, and intimidating applicants when off-record.79  
Notwithstanding occasional government protests to the contrary, the problem has become 
obvious and severe.80 
¶21 The root of the problem lies not in some inherent incompetence of immigration 
judges, but rather in the system itself.  It must be said, in fairness, that most immigration 
judges discharge their duties ethically, meticulously, and respectfully.  Unfortunately, the 
system has also tolerated and even encouraged those judges who do not.  While the 
Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) has published an ethics manual for 
immigration judges and the BIA,81 until recently the disciplinary system operated in 
secrecy and was seen as “not worth the paper it’s printed on.”82  Attorney General 
Gonzales has recently directed the creation of a formal Code of Conduct and performance 
evaluations performed by EOIR, however, based upon the results of the immigration 
court survey commenced in early 2006.83  While these are clearly praiseworthy 
developments, some caution may be warranted until the substance and effect of these 
reforms is known.84  Rumors of EOIR’s willful blindness to misconduct, and the 
condemning judgments of the federal circuit courts, leave an impression not easily 
erased.85 
¶22 Many critics trace the problem back to Attorney General John Ashcroft’s 
aggressive reforms of 2002 and 2003.86  In January of 2002, the National Association of 
Immigration Judges (NAIJ) formally asked Congress to remove their courts from the 
control of the Department of Justice (DOJ).87  The request was the culmination of a 
bipartisan congressional study by the United States Commission on Immigration Reform, 
which concluded that the immigration courts would best function free from “[t]he taint of 
                                                 
79 MacLean, Immigration Bench, supra note 6. 
80 National Association of Immigration Judges President Denise Slavin, for example, stated “[t]here’s two 
circuits that have mentioned less than a handful of judges, and when you look at the volume of cases going 
up, I think we’re talking about just a very minor issue at this point.”  Juan Castillo, Review of Immigration 
Courts is Ordered; U.S. Attorney General Also Warns Judges to Treat Claims Fairly, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Jan. 11, 2006, at A9 (Slavin was referring to the Ninth and Second Circuits).  But see, e.g.,  
Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (the Seventh Circuit surveying the problem); 
Wang v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2005) (the Third Circuit surveying the 
problem); Alarcon-Chavez v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that the immigration 
judge exhibited “an arbitrary exercise of judicial fiat at the expense of a powerless alien whom the DHS 
had already found to have a credible fear of returning to Cuba”). 
81 EOIR, ETHICS MANUAL (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/handbook.pdf 
[hereinafter ETHICS MANUAL]. 
82 MacLean, Immigration Judges, supra note 25 (quoting Susan Akram, immigration and human rights 
associate professor at Boston University School of Law). 
83 See Press Release, Department of Justice, supra note 8. 
84 See Christina Velez, Rolling the Dice: Is the DOJ Proposal Adequate to Correct Problems in Our 
Immigration Courts?, IMMIGRATION NEWS, Oct. 12, 2006, http://www.ilw.com/articles/2006,1012-
velez.shtm. 
85 See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
86 See, e.g. Legomsky, Deportation, supra note 68, at 370; Morning Edition: Complaints Prompt 
Government Review of Immigration Courts (NPR Radio broadcast Feb. 9, 2006) (“Lawyer Ira Kurzban 
traces [the problems] to changes former Attorney General John Ashcroft made at the Board of Immigration 
Appeals.”). 
87 Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges, An Independent Immigration Court: An Idea Whose Time has Come 
(Jan. 2002) (unpublished position paper, on file with author) [hereinafter NAIJ Proposal]; see generally 
Lisa Getter, Immigration Judges Call for Independent Court, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2002, at A1 (providing a 
narrative account). 
11 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  L A W  A N D  S O C I A L  PO L I C Y  [ 2 0 0 7  
 
inherent conflict of interest caused by housing the Immigration Court within the DOJ.”88  
The concern stemmed from, among other reasons, repeated instances of intervention in 
immigration cases by colluding INS and DOJ officials seeking to bypass the adjudicatory 
process.89 
¶23 Attorney General Ashcroft responded quickly—but in the manner opposite to what 
NAIJ had hoped.  In 2002 he announced his intention to reduce the number of judges on 
the BIA, and in March 2003 he gutted the BIA from twenty-three to just eleven judges.90  
As data compiled by longtime House Judiciary Committee legal staff member Peter 
Levinson revealed, Ashcroft removed exclusively those members with the most “liberal” 
records.91  Ashcroft also promulgated new regulations which subtly redefined the role of 
the BIA members.  Whereas the Code of Federal Regulations governing the BIA 
previously began “Board Members shall exercise their independent judgment and 
discretion in cases coming before the Board,” upon Ashcroft’s amendments the sentence 
was replaced thus: “The Board members shall be attorneys appointed by the Attorney 
General to act as the Attorney General’s delegates in the cases that come before them.”92  
While Ashcroft’s reformation of the immigration bench was a top-down process, 
immigration judges are as vulnerable to discretionary “reassignment” as the purged BIA 
members.93  As Professor Stephen Legomsky put it, “[t]he message was simple: ‘You 
rule against the government at your personal peril.’”94 
¶24 What the Seventh Circuit has deemed “adjudication . . . below the minimum 
standards of legal justice,”95 in other words, may have been precisely Ashcroft’s brand of 
justice all along.  The glimmer of hope such a realization provides is that a system so 
consciously destroyed may likewise be consciously repaired.  As the following sections 
demonstrate, however, meaningful reform must look beyond the trial level and individual 
immigration judges.  Just as immigration judges are insulated by seemingly toothless 
ethical standards, immigration decisions are insulated by extraordinarily deferential 
review. 
C. Up for Review: Administrative and Federal Courts 
¶25 Despite the foregoing review, perhaps the most glaring fault of the current 
procedural system has been its deficiencies on appeal.  The problem is two-fold: first on 
administrative appeal to the BIA, and second on federal appeal to the circuit courts.  As 
the following sections demonstrate, the problems generally trace back once again to the 
Ashcroft reforms of 2002. 
                                                 
88 NAIJ Proposal, supra note 87, at 8. 
89 See Legomsky, Deportation, supra note 68, at 373 
90 Id. at 376. 
91 Id. (citing Peter J. Levinson, The Façade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate 
Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1164 (2004), available at 
http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/files/peter_article.pdf). 
92 Compare 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1) (2002) with 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1) (2003).  Ashcroft’s version remains in the 
current Code of Federal Regulations.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2006).  Ashcroft did not remove the 
language regarding decisional independence entirely, but diluted and buried it deeper in the regulations, 
rather than give them top billing as before.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). 
93 See Legomsky, Deportation, supra note 68, at 373-74 and sources cited therein. 
94 Id. at 370. 
95 Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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1. The Board of Immigration Appeals 
¶26 “When the BIA had a more active role, it would clean up decisions . . . . Now the 
BIA is a rubber stamp.”96  So said former BIA Judge Lory Rosenberg recently to the 
National Law Journal, voicing a not uncommon charge.97  Judge Rosenberg referred to 
Attorney General Ashcroft’s expansion of BIA “streamlining,” which is a process by 
which a single BIA member may affirm an immigration judge’s decision without any 
issued opinion.98  Streamlining, however, is not the only problem.  Deferential factual 
review and continued misuse of country conditions reports also plague BIA decisions.  
These latter considerations set the stage for the downfalls of streamlining, and are thus 
reviewed first. 
i) Administrative Factfinding: From De Novo Review to No Review 
¶27 Prior to 2002, the BIA exercised independent authority in reviewing immigration 
judges’ decisions de novo, for both issues of fact and law.99  Despite this authority, the 
BIA’s review of factual determinations was distinctly deferential, keeping in mind the 
unique position of the immigration judge to hear the applicant’s testimony personally.100  
To strike the appropriate balance, the BIA would parse the factual determinations of the 
immigration judge to ensure reasonableness, but would err on the side of deference.101  
This brand of de novo review protected asylum applicants from the sort of reckless abuse 
reviewed supra Part II.B., while also recognizing and respecting the function of the 
immigration courts. 
¶28 The BIA no longer may conduct de novo factual review, and instead must adopt the 
immigration judge’s factual determinations only unless they are “clearly erroneous.”102  
Ashcroft’s reforms also expressly prohibit the BIA from engaging in any factfinding of 
its own.103  In practice, this generally means that immigration judges’ factual 
determinations, either for or against the individual, are insulated from any review 
whatsoever.104  While a “clearly erroneous” standard of factual review is not uncommon 
in appellate review, the BIA is an uncommon body reviewing uncommon adjudicative 
deficiencies with uncommonly severe ramifications.105  What administrative efficiency 
                                                 
96 MacLean, Immigration Bench, supra note 6. 
97 See id. 
98 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4); see generally John R.B. Palmer, Stephen Yale-Loehr, Elizabeth Cronin, Why 
Are so Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court?  An 
Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 23 (2005). 
99 See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (2001); see also In re A-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1106, 1109 (BIA 1998) (“It is 
axiomatic that the Board has the authority to employ a de novo standard of appellate review in deciding the 
ultimate disposition of a case.”) (citations omitted). 
100 See Kerns, supra note 21, at 204 and sources cited therein. 
101 See, e.g. In re A-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 1109-12 (parsing the factual record, but ultimately determining 
that the immigration judge’s findings were “supported by specific and cogent reasons,” and that therefore 
“we will not substitute our judgment for that of the Immigration Judge”). 
102 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3). 
103 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,902, 54,905 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)). 
104 See, e.g., In re Francisco de Assis, A29274116, 2003 WL 23521839 (BIA Nov. 3, 2003) (unpublished 
decision) (denying review of respondent’s protests regarding notice of hearings and voluntary departure); 
In re Hung Phuoc Nguyen, A44233829, 2005 WL 3802171 (BIA Dec. 6, 2005) (unpublished decision) 
(affirming the immigration judge’s grant of asylum based on credibility and country conditions findings, 
despite DHS’s protests, because these are non-reviewable findings of fact).
105 See supra Part II.B; see also In re A-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 1114 (Schmidt, J., dissenting). 
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may be accomplished by preserving immigration judges’ factual determinations should 
be tempered by considering the potential harm to asylum applicants or to the government. 
ii) Administrative Notice: How to Reject Credible Refugees 
¶29 Rather than keeping immigration judges’ overreliance upon State Department 
reports in check, the BIA has gone even further by taking uncontested administrative 
notice of the reports.106  Although the BIA may not engage in factfinding, the applicable 
regulations grant the BIA an exception to take administrative notice of “the contents of 
official documents.”107  In practice, the BIA will take administrative notice of any country 
report, assuming the BIA deems it useful.  While country reports may be a useful tool for 
the represented asylum applicant, for the pro se applicant the effect may be to 
perfunctorily reject credible testimony without affording the applicant even the 
opportunity to respond.108 
¶30 The problem is one of contestability.  Not only does administrative notice of 
country reports rely on an unknown and un-present author,109 it also lacks the asylum 
applicant’s perspective entirely.110  Some federal courts, moreover, have upheld the BIA’s 
refusal to even provide the individual an opportunity to argue against administrative 
notice.111  Considering that the BIA has never been required to “independently specify its 
reasons for rejecting every piece of evidence,”112 affording the BIA such additional 
latitude opens the door for patently superficial analysis to the detriment of defenseless 
refugees.  In In re E-P-, for example, the BIA relied on a State Department report in 
making the now-laughable determination that the 1997 U.S. involvement in Haiti had 
restored democracy, human rights, and stability to the troubled country.113  The decision 
acknowledged but ignored reports of continuing paramilitary threats, and their specific 
relevance to the asylum applicant’s claims.114  The applicant was not afforded an 
opportunity to testify in response, and was ordered removed to Haiti—where, in 2004, 
                                                 
106 See, e.g., Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding administrative notice of 
changed country conditions in asylum claims). 
107 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv). 
108 See, e.g., Matter of H-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 683, 690 (BIA 1993) (taking administrative notice of changed 
country conditions to rebut petitioner’s presumption of well-founded fear based on past-persecution); see 
generally ANNA MARIE GALLAGHER, 2 IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE § 10.107 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing 
generally the administrative notice of changed country conditions). 
109 See Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he authors of these reports are 
anonymous and there is no opportunity for the asylum-seeker to cross-examine any of them. . . . [T]he 
evidentiary infirmities of the country reports are important in placing in perspective a startling evidentiary 
ruling of which the [applicants] complain.”). 
110 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Official Notice of Changed Country Conditions in Asylum Adjudication: 
Lessons from International Refugee Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 45, 69 (1996) (“[A] court attempting to 
review the BIA’s determination of changed circumstances is left entirely without the benefit of the 
applicant’s perspective on the effect of changed circumstances on his or her claim.  Since substantial 
evidence review must be based on consideration of both supporting and opposing evidence, meaningful 
review of such a stunted record is impossible.”). 
111 See Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 597 (holding that the discretionary motion to re-open provides the 
petitioner sufficient procedural safeguards under the Refugee Act and Due Process Clause), reviewed by 
Margulies, supra note 21, at 19 n.46. 
112 Petrovic v. INS, 198 F.3d 1034, 1038 (7th Cir. 2000). 
113 In re E-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 860, 862-63 (BIA 1997). 
114 Id. at 863. 
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paramilitary forces captured towns and cities during a violent uprising, President Aristide 
was forced into exile, and retributive and political killings escalated.115 
¶31 Just as immigration judges might lazily rely upon legislative reports for 
adjudicative factfinding, the BIA may likewise uphold such deficiencies and provide 
perfunctory factual determinations itself.  What is being considered, what weight it is 
given, and what its veracity may be is indeterminable and uncontestable.116  Whether one 
is pro- or anti-immigration, the failure to diligently discern between meritorious and non-
meritorious claims should be alarming for any serious immigration reformist. 
iii) BIA “Streamlining:” Letting Go Completely 
¶32 The problems of administrative appeal reviewed thus far are but mere details when 
compared to BIA streamlining.  In 2002 Attorney General Ashcroft finalized BIA 
streamlining, a procedure whereby a single BIA member must affirm an immigration 
judge’s decision without opinion (“affirm without opinion,” or AWO), if that BIA 
member concludes the initial decision was correct and that any errors were harmless.117  
AWO is mandatory, not discretionary.118  Prior to 2002, BIA decisions were arrived at by 
a three-member panel, except in certain circumstances designated by the Board Chairman 
under an experimental and limited version of streamlining.119  As the regulations now 
make clear, one-member affirmances without published opinion are the new norm.120  In 
2004, the eleven members of the BIA decided 48,707 cases, approximately ninety-three 
percent of which were issued by a single board member.121 
¶33 It is often said that there are four goals of any administrative process: accuracy, 
efficiency, acceptability, and consistency.122  The streamlining regulations, and the 
curiously concurrent purge of BIA members, violate all of these goals.  Streamlining 
                                                 
115 See Timeline: Haiti, BBC NEWS, Feb. 16, 2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1202857.stm (detailing the country’s descent into violence after 
Aristide’s rigged election); see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Haiti, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES—2005 (2006), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61731.htm (“The government’s human 
rights record remained poor. . . . [R]etribution killings and politically motivated violence continued 
throughout the country.”). 
116 E.g., Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26, 34 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding BIA decision “apparently based  
. . . solely on the change of government in Nicaragua, without any examination of how that change related 
to [the applicant’s] particular claims”).  For a full discussion of different courts’ treatment of country 
condition reports, see GALLAGHER, supra note 108; cf. Kerns, supra note 21, at 205 (“The BIA has 
provided no explicit guidance for assessing the evidentiary weight of differing pieces of country conditions 
information . . . .”). 
117 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4). 
118 Id. (“The Board member to whom a case is assigned shall affirm the decision of the Service or the 
immigration judge, without opinion, if the Board member determines that the result reached in the decision 
under review was correct . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
119 See Palmer et al., supra note 98, at 23-27. 
120 The regulations enumerate six limited circumstances under which review by a three-member panel, 
rather than the single-member standard, is permissible.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6). 
121 EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2004 STATISTICAL 
YEARBOOK at U1 (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy04syb.pdf. 
122 See Stephen Yale-Loehr, Am. Immigr. Law. Ass’n (AILA), Statement Before the House Committee on 
the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims (Feb. 6, 2002), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/yaleloehr020602.htm [hereinafter Yale-Loehr Statement]; see generally 
Stephen Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration 
Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1313 (1986) (reviewing the concept’s creation by Roger Crampton and its 
adoption and refinement by others over time) [hereinafter Legomsky, Forum Choices]. 
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decreases accuracy by diminishing meaningful review.123  Streamlining decreases 
efficiency because, although the BIA may succeed in initially clearing its backlog, the 
level of adjudicative accuracy is so low that the circuit courts have been forced to remand 
a vastly increased percentage of cases for repeated hearings.124  A system that routinely 
remands cases for repeated hearings, quite plainly, is one that institutionalizes 
inefficiency.125  Streamlining decreases acceptability,126 as demonstrated factually by the 
widespread revolt of the immigration community.127  As a comprehensive study 
published in the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal determines, “[m]any lawyers 
have lost faith in the BIA and are now concentrating their energy and resources on the 
federal courts of appeal instead.”128  Streamlining also decreases consistency, because the 
elimination of written opinions diminishes institutional memory and the development of 
legal doctrine through case law. 
¶34 Administrative notice of country conditions reports and a distinct lack of 
meaningful factual review, as reviewed supra, had already sent the BIA down a 
dangerous path notwithstanding streamlining.  With the reduction of the size of the BIA 
and the enactment of one-member affirmations without opinion—often performed not 
even by a BIA member directly, but rather by administrative staff129—the BIA has been 
restructured to abandon its adjudicative duties completely.  The result is a system that 
tolerates immigration judges’ faulty decisions, replaces meaningful administrative review 
with a rubber stamp, and leaves the federal courts of appeal with an administrative record 
bearing little meaningful relation to the petitioner’s claim.130 
                                                 
123 See, e.g., Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 331 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[By AWO], the BIA may have 
shirked its role and duty of ensuring that the final agency determination in an immigration case is 
reasonably sound and reasonably current.  The decision here on review is neither, and it is an 
embarrassment to the Agency on multiple levels.”). 
124 The Seventh Circuit, for example, reversed a staggering forty-eight percent of appeals from the BIA in 
the last year.  MacLean, Immigration Bench, supra note 6; Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (“In the year ending on the date of the argument, different panels of this court reversed the [BIA] 
in whole or part in a staggering 40 percent of the 136 petitions to review the Board that were resolved on 
the merits.”). 
125 Yale-Loehr Statement, supra note 122 (“Any system that routinely involves remands for purposes of 
clearer decisions in the courts below cannot be said to achieve any type of efficiency; rather, such a system 
would institutionalize inefficiency.”). 
126 Legomsky defines acceptability as “having a procedure that the litigants and the general public perceive 
as fair.”  Legomsky, Forum Choices, supra note 122, at 1313 (citations omitted). 
127 See generally MacLean, Immigration Bench, supra note 6 (citing complaints).  Loud criticism has 
emerged from every conceivable segment of the relevant legal community, including lawyers, scholars, 
Congresspersons, immigration judges, and former Board Members.  See generally Palmer et al., supra note 
98, at 5.  An unsuccessful Administrative Procedures Act suit was even brought in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia, arguing that the Department of Justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
promulgating the 2002 reforms.  Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coalition v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 264 F. 
Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2003). 
128 Palmer et al., supra note 98 at 88.  The federal courts of appeal, for their part, are in agreement.  E.g., 
Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533-35 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting the BIA’s “disturbing” practice of affirming 
“either with no opinion or with a very short, unhelpful, boilerplate opinion, even, as in this case, the 
immigration judge’s opinion contains manifest errors of logic.”); see generally Liptak, supra note 3 
(quoting, among others, Judge John M. Walker, Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, as stating “[w]e’re the 
first meaningful review that the [immigrant] petitioner has.”). 
129 See Palmer et al., supra note 98, at 25 (“In practice, streamlining relied heavily on the BIA’s team of 
staff attorneys and paralegals.  This staff was involved in not only recommending outcomes and drafting 
opinions, but also determining which cases would be sent to single Board Members for summary 
affirmance.”). 
130 As indicated throughout this section, see Palmer et al., surpa note 98, for a comprehensive analysis of 
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2. The Federal Courts of Appeal 
¶35 By the time an asylum case arrives at a federal court of appeals, the administrative 
record may be so confusing that it is no longer of any use at all.131  Initial credible fear 
determinations are made by officers on the spot, with no development or consideration of 
the factual record.132  Subsequent immigration judge decisions may be distempered, 
careless, or simply unintelligible.133  The BIA may summarily affirm such decisions 
without explanation.134  The federal circuit courts, faced with this mess, may be forced to 
pronounce a brand of justice that is as illusory as the administrative record it is predicated 
upon.135 
¶36 Federal courts considering BIA findings are obligated to exercise review with 
extreme deference.136  A BIA finding of no credible fear of persecution must stand, upon 
the closed factual record,137 unless the evidence is “so compelling that no reasonable 
factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.”138  This “compelling 
evidence” standard sets a bar that has been construed as higher than the typical 
“substantial evidence” standard of administrative review, despite the “benefit of the 
doubt” supposedly afforded to asylum seekers.139  Among other shortcomings, this 
standard of review forecloses virtually any meaningful evaluation of the agency’s factual 
determinations and use of country reports.140 
¶37 In one illustrative case, the Third Circuit in Berishaj v. Ashcroft found itself facing 
an administrative record so deficient that the court simply admitted that it could not 
exercise meaningful review.141  The initial adverse determination by the immigration 
judge had no apparent relation to the record.142  The factual administrative record, 
including country condition reports, was more than four years out of date.143  The BIA 
affirmed the immigration judge’s decision without opinion, neither supplementing nor 
expressing an evaluation of the administrative record.144  The result, the court chided, was 
an “embarrassment to the Agency on multiple levels.”145  Not only was the immigration 
judge’s initial opinion “open to ridicule,”146 but the BIA’s failure to supplement or review 
                                                                                                                                                 
BIA streamlining. 
131 See, e.g., Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 331 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We therefore call on the BIA to adopt 
. . . policies that will avoid the Court of Appeals having to review administrative records so out-of-date as 
to verge on meaningless.”). 
132 See supra § II.A. 
133 See supra § II.B. 
134 See supra § II.C.i. 
135 Berishaj, 378 F.3d at 317. 
136 Kerns, supra note 21, at 206. 
137 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(A) (2000); Berishaj, 378 F.3d at 328 (“It is a salutary principle of administrative 
law review that the reviewing court act upon a closed record.”). 
138 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992), reviewed by Berishaj, 378 F.3d at 322-23.  The 
Elias-Zacarias standard is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 
139 Kerns, supra note 21, at 214. 
140 See, e.g., Petrovic v. INS, 198 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2000); Kerns, supra note 21, at 206-07. 
141 Berishaj, 378 F.3d at 317. 
142 Id. at 324 (deriding the immigration judge’s discussion as being “not tethered to the record, owing what 
little support they have to hyperbole and appeals to popular culture”). 
143 Id. at 317. 
144 Id. at 317, 331. 
145 Id. at 331. 
146 Id. 
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the record suggested an indifferent “not our problem” attitude.147  Given the Third 
Circuit’s limited scope of review, moreover, the court could not compensate for the 
decision’s deficiencies by supplementing the record itself.148 
¶38 The Court thus turned directly to Congress and the Executive, and issued the 
following plea: 
[W]e call on Congress, the Department of Justice, the Department of 
Homeland Security, and the BIA to improve the structure and operation of 
the system, so that all may have the confidence that the ultimate 
disposition of a removal case bears a meaningful connection to the merits 
of the petitioner’s claim(s) in light of contemporary world affairs.149
D. Through the Looking Glass (and what the courts, administration, and legislature 
found there) 
1. Circuit court response 
¶39 An unintended consequence of BIA streamlining has been the widespread rousing 
of the circuit courts.150  Since the enactment of streamlining in 2002, the immigration 
caseload of the circuit courts has expanded from just below 200 cases per month to nearly 
1,200.151  Yet, without procedural reform, there is little the circuit courts can do but 
complain.  The extremely limited scope of review afforded the circuit courts prevents 
them from significantly intervening in the merits of asylum adjudication.152  Cases 
involving “cookie-cutter” determinations or abusive judges are typically remanded to 
work their way once again through the immigration courts.153  There is, unfortunately, no 
procedural guarantee that an order to “do it again” means that it will be done right. 
¶40 Judicial responses to the problem of inadequate administrative records, as reviewed 
in Berishaj, have been strained and divided.  The Seventh Circuit has instituted the 
practice of taking “judicial notice of post-final-agency-determination developments, in 
the form of new country reports, and at times rests its disposition on these 
                                                 
147 Id. (noting further that “[o]utdated administrative records are the BIA’s problem”). 
148 Id. at 328. 
149 Id. at 317.  The court directed the clerk to send a copy of the opinion to a wide variety of relevant 
government officials.  Id. at 331-32. 
150 See Liptak, supra note 3, at A1 (quoting Second Circuit Judge John Walker: “[Ashcroft] just moved the 
problem from one court to another court. . . . We’re the first meaningful review that the petitioner has”); see 
also Ming Shi Xue v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 439 F.3d 111, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Asylum 
petitions . . . are not games. . . . [D]espite their volume, these suits are not to be disposed of improvidently, 
or without the care and judicial attention—by immigration judges, in the first instance, and by federal 
judges, on appeal—to which all litigants are entitled.  We should not forget, after all, what is at stake.  For 
each time we wrongly deny a meritorious asylum application, concluding that an immigrant’s story is 
fabricated when, in fact, it is real, we risk condemning an individual to persecution.  Whether the 
danger is of religious discrimination, extrajudicial punishment, forced abortion or involuntary 
sterilization, physical torture or banishment, we must always remember the toll that is paid if and 
when we err.”).
151 Palmer et al., supra note 98, § IV.A. 
152 See supra Part II.C.ii. 
153 E.g., Paramasamy v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding a boilerplate adverse 
credibility determination that, upon review of the transcript, actually bore no relation to the asylum 
applicant); Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533-35 (7th Cir. 2005) (succinctly reviewing typical errors of 
immigration determinations and remanding the case). 
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developments.”154  This practice clearly violates Supreme Court precedent, however, that 
the federal courts must base their review of administrative agency determinations “purely 
on the basis of the reasons offered by, and the record compiled before, the agency 
itself.”155  Indeed, even the Seventh Circuit itself has voiced apprehension regarding 
introduction of administrative and judicial notice in asylum proceedings.156  Not only 
does taking judicial notice risk depriving the applicant of the opportunity to be heard,157 it 
also “carries with it the potential for wholesale relitigation of many immigration-law 
claims.”158  The Third Circuit, for this reason, simply returns the claim for administrative 
rehearing when it determines the record is deficient beyond reasonable use.159  As noted 
earlier, however, such remands decrease efficiency and confidence in the immigration 
courts,160 and provide no assurance that the system’s procedural faults will right 
themselves.  With these concerns in mind, the circuit courts remain divided concerning 
the use of judicial notice.161 
2. Administrative response: The Attorney General and the Office of Immigration 
Litigation  
¶41 Attorney General Gonzales concluded his review of the immigration courts and 
BIA on August 9, 2006, by announcing the implementation of twenty-two reforms.162  
Highlights of the reforms include establishment of a code of conduct for immigration 
judges and the BIA, a performance evaluation process for immigration judges and the 
BIA, increasing the size of the BIA, and direction to prepare a plan seeking budget 
increases for the immigration courts and BIA.163  Conversely, however, the reforms also 
entail preservation of BIA streamlining and increase sanction authorities for immigration 
judges “to control their courtrooms.”164  The reforms do not seem to affect procedural 
rules of the immigration courts, however, and the substance of the proposed code of 
conduct is yet unknown.  Praising or criticizing the effectiveness of the reforms, 
therefore, may still be premature. 
                                                 
154 Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 330 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 532, 
540-41 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
155 Id. (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943)). 
156 See, e.g., Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the BIA misapplied the doctrine 
of administrative notice, which “[l]ike its more familiar cousin, judicial notice . . . authorizes the finder of 
fact to waive proof of facts that cannot seriously be contested”). 
157 See supra Part II(d)(i); see generally Strandburg, supra note 110, at 68. 
158 Berishaj, 378 F.3d at 330. 
159 Berishaj, 378 F.3d at 316 (“We leave it to the Agency to make a proper determination in the first 
instance of the merits of [the applicant’s asylum] claims.”). 
160 See supra Part II.C.i.3. 
161 Compare Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 532, 540-41 (7th Cir. 2004) (approving notice), with 
Berishaj, 378 F.3d at 330 (disapproving notice). 
162 Department of Justice, Measures to Improve the Immigration Courts and the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.cyrusmehta.com/related/DOJ_Memo_dt_08_09_06.pdf 
[hereinafter DOJ Reforms]. 
163 See id. 
164 Id. 
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¶42 In a limited response to Berishaj,165 the Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL)166 
also enacted a new policy designed to screen asylum appeals with stale administrative 
records.167  This new policy, as described in the appendix to Ambartsoumian v. 
Ashcroft,168 establishes that “as a matter of prosecutorial discretion” the government 
should screen out and seek to remand cases involving outdated records.169  To effectuate 
this, the Director of OIL has informed all attorneys under his supervision to bring cases to 
his attention when those cases favor remand.  In determining whether a case favors 
remand, the attorney should consider such factors as “(1) whether there have been 
pertinent, intervening events in the country of removal; and (2) whether the issues on 
review are ‘time sensitive’ in that changes in conditions over time may affect the 
resolution of the cases.”170  The policies have yet to elicit much response from the federal 
courts or commentators.171 
3. Legislative Response: REAL ID Act 
¶43 The REAL ID Act of 2005172 neither holds itself out to be nor effects a response to 
the concerns reviewed herein, but its provisions are quite significant.  The reforms, 
designed explicitly to “prevent[] terrorists from obtaining relief from removal,” raise the 
burden of proof for asylum seekers and broaden the discretion of immigration judges to 
deny asylum.173  While some Congresspersons have criticized the 2002 reforms,174 the 
REAL ID Act is the only relevant enacted legislation since then.  As a review,175 the 
Act’s most relevant provisions are the following: 
 Require an applicant to establish that a “central reason” of his or 
her persecution was one of the enumerated protected grounds for 
asylum;176  
                                                 
165 Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2004). 
166 OIL, acting under the Attorney General, has jurisdiction over all civil immigration litigation.  See 
generally Office of Immigration Litigation, http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/oil/ (last visited May 24, 2007). 
167 See Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 2004). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 94-95. 
170 Id. 
171 But see Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 218 (3d Cir. 2005). (noting the new policy’s failure to 
resolve the outdated record in that case). 
172 Pub L. No. 109-12, 119 Stat. 231. 
173 See supra Part II.B.ii. 
174 Senator Patrick Leahy, for example, recently published a statement that “[i]f the Attorney General wants 
to reduce the immigration workload of our federal courts, he should restore the fair appeals process within 
the Justice Department that his predecessor diminished through his misguided restructuring of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals.”  Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator (D – Vt.), Comments on Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales’s Remarks at the Hoover Institution (Feb. 28, 2005), available at 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200502/022805b.html. 
175 The provisions of the REAL ID Act are reviewed and criticized, in part, in supra Part II.B.ii. 
176 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-12, 119 Stat. 231, § 101(a)(B)(i) (2005).  Caselaw until the 
REAL ID Act held that the applicant in a “mixed motive” case need not show the exact motivation for the 
persecutor’s actions, so long as the actions were motivated simply in part by one of the enumerated 
grounds.  See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996); see generally KURZBAN, supra note 11, 
at 297 (surveying mixed motive cases). 
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 Allow immigration judges to base credibility determinations on 
demeanor alone;177 
 Allow immigration judges to base credibility determinations on the 
consistency of the applicant’s statements internally, or with other 
evidence of record, including State Department reports;178 and 
 Allow immigration judges to deny asylum based on lack of 
corroborating evidence, even if the applicant presents otherwise 
credible testimony.179 
¶44 The faults of these specific provisions have already been addressed, in part, in the 
preceding sections.180  The REAL ID Act’s shortcomings, however, cannot be adequately 
discussed by narrowly focusing on the act’s provisions individually.  The real problem is 
one of perspective. 
III. CRITIQUE: A NEW PERSPECTIVE 
¶45 “It is wrong from beginning to end,” said the Caterpillar, decidedly; and there was 
silence for some minutes.181 
A. The First Step: Admitting the Problem 
¶46 The American asylum system has become a wonderland of arbitrary procedures 
yielding arbitrary results.  The problems of the U.S. asylum system are not singularly 
discrete, but rather are interrelated symptoms of a process poorly understood and 
becoming increasingly wayward.  Meaningless evidentiary standards, arbitrary assertions 
of judicial fiat, and institutionalized indifference have turned the administrative system 
on its head.  For Congress, however, it may as well all be the fictional Wonderland of 
Lewis Carroll.  It is remarkable how distinctly opposite Congress’s reforms run to the 
criticisms levied by the judiciary, practitioners, and academics.  The greatest hurdle in 
reforming the asylum system lies not in finding solutions,182 but rather in simply 
appreciating the problems.  The two most recent government reforms are critiqued below. 
1. Administrative Reforms: The Attorney General and OIL 
¶47 Attorney General Gonzales’s twenty-two reform directives are a welcome response 
to judicial abuse in the immigration courts.  The deliberate creation of a code of conduct 
and an oversight process managed by EOIR directly respond to the criticisms of the 
Circuit Courts and immigration commentators.  The reforms also, however, leave much 
unresolved.  Most pointedly, the reforms propose a mechanism to police the immigration 
system without actually reforming the system itself.  Both the prosecution and 
                                                 
177 REAL ID Act of 2005 § 101(a)(B)(iii). 
178 Id. 
179 Id. § 101(a)(B)(ii). 
180 Supra Part II.B.ii. 
181 CARROLL, supra note 1.  
182 Many have already been proposed.  See, e.g., Martin, supra note 130; Kerns, supra note 21; Strandburg, 
supra note 110.  See infra Parts III.B. and III.C. 
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adjudication of immigration claims, for example, continue to be determined by the 
Executive branch, maintaining an inherent conflict of interest.  The reforms’ provision of 
additional sanction power to immigration judges, above and beyond pre-existing sanction 
power,183 also provides immigration judges with further means to intimidate asylum 
applicants.  Finally, as of this writing, the “code of conduct” itself and the oversight 
procedures it entails have yet to be drafted and implemented.  The perspective necessary 
to evaluate the reforms, therefore, will not exist for some time. 
¶48 OIL’s reforms are also largely indeterminable, albeit for different reasons.184  The 
only evidence of OIL’s supposed response to Berishaj is found in Ambartsoumian v. 
Ashcroft, where the court appended the government’s explanation of its new policy.185  
One is left with the impression that the court’s generous transparency was intended to 
satisfy curious readers, unable to find any record of the policy elsewhere.  Indeed, it 
appears that even the Third Circuit has little knowledge of the workings of the policy.  In 
Kamara v. Att’y Gen., the only post-Ambartsoumian decision considering the OIL policy, 
the court could only offer one sentence in review of OIL’s determination: “DHS states 
that ‘[t]his case has been screened pursuant to this policy,’ and it has deemed remand 
inappropriate.”186  This cryptic pronouncement only invites speculation. 
¶49 Speculation regarding OIL’s stance on State Department reports, moreover, only 
begets more speculation.  Since Berishaj, the only official mention OIL has given 
regarding its reliance on these reports has been in its December 2004 issue of its 
Immigration Litigation Bulletin.187  An article by OIL officer John Cunningham goes to 
great lengths to dismiss courts’ dissatisfaction with reliance upon State Department 
reports as “dicta in its purest sense.”188  Instead, Cunningham forcefully advocates 
deference to State Department reports “because they concern matters within that agency’s 
area of expertise.”189  Cunningham concludes by asserting that “no court has held that 
State Department reports do not constitute substantial evidence.”190 
¶50 Regardless of the substantive quality of Cunningham’s assertions, the thrust of the 
article provides insight into OIL’s position on State Department reports: not only may 
they be relied upon, but they ought to be relied upon.  Never mind that the Department of 
Justice has been entrusted to adjudicate immigration and asylum claims—these are 
matters “within [the State Department’s] area of expertise.”191  This position contradicts 
broad reformist judicial and academic sentiment against mechanical deference to the 
State Department by stubbornly insisting upon the status quo.  Hope for progressive 
reform from OIL seems naïve. 
                                                 
183 Compare DOJ Reforms, supra note 162, with 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.101-1003.109. 
184 See supra Part II.D.ii. for a summary of the policy. 
185 Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 2004). 
186 Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 218-19 (3d Cir. 2005).  Note that the court in fact disagreed with 
the determination.  Id. 
187 See Cunningham, supra note 38.  The bulletin is available online in PDF format 
http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/oil/immigration_bulletin.htm.  
188 Cunningham, supra note 38, at 5. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id.  But see Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000) (criticizing deference to State Department 
reports because, in part, it is the Attorney General and not the Secretary of State who is entrusted to make 
asylum determinations); supra Part II.B.i. 
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¶51 Whatever OIL’s actual position on the current evidentiary system may be, it is 
likely not the ideal administrative body to resolve problems of fairness and 
accountability.192  By internalizing the problem, OIL further cloaks the asylum process in 
uncertainty.  Perhaps more pointedly, OIL’s procedural reforms apparently do not even 
involve the asylum applicant.  Rather than affording the applicant an opportunity to be 
heard, the reforms merely attempt to shift decisions regarding country conditions away 
from the courts and internalize them.  Even assuming OIL’s reforms are sincere, they 
neither succeed nor inspire confidence by virtue of their opacity.193 
2. REAL ID Act 
¶52 The primary problem with the evidentiary system in asylum proceedings is that it 
tolerates poorly reasoned determinations.194  The issue is not whether more or less asylum 
seekers ought to be admitted as an aggregate whole; it is simply that our asylum system 
ought to accurately determine which asylum applicants qualify under our current laws 
and which do not.  Our current system falls well short of this goal.195 
¶53 The REAL ID Act further removes this goal from the realm of possibility.  The Act 
simultaneously increases the petitioner’s burden196 while decreasing the immigration 
judge’s obligation to tether his or her determinations to the factual record.197  Meanwhile, 
the Act offers no response to concerns regarding streamlining procedures that turn the 
BIA into a rubber-stamping machine, or the problem of deficient administrative records.  
Indeed, the Act gives immigration judges greater latitude to issue decisions that are based 
more on feeling than factual record,198 and explicitly endorses reliance upon State 
Department reports.199  The REAL ID Act is, in short, an affront to Judge Becker’s pleas 
in Berishaj as echoed by other courts and academics throughout the country.200 
¶54 The far-reaching nature of the REAL ID Act suggests that Congress was more 
concerned with political pandering on terrorism than judicial function.  An early version 
of the Act, for example, incorporated a second bill that would have restricted all judicial 
review, including habeas corpus, in all removal proceedings, including asylum.201  Article 
One of the U.S. Constitution provides that “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
                                                 
192 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
193 Early reports from the case-law already confirm the concern.  See, e.g., Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 
202, 218 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[D]espite the new policy implemented by the Attorney General, we again are 
faced with an administrative record which appears woefully outdated.”).
194 See Kerns, supra note 21, at 197 (“United States immigration courts have tended to rely selectively, 
without reasoned analysis, on information bits that are decontextualized from what is known about a 
country of origin from the record as a whole. . . . Such distortions of the record go unchecked by an 
extraordinarily deferential standard of judicial review.”). 
195 See supra Part II. 
196 See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-12, 119 Stat. 231, § 101(a)(B)(i) (2005) (requiring a 
showing of the persecution’s “central reason”). 
197 Id. §§ 101(a)(B)(ii), (iii). 
198 Id. § 101(a)(B)(iii) (stating that the trier of fact may base his or her credibility determination on any one 
of a number of factors). 
199 Id. 
200 See generally supra Part II.C.ii. 
201 See Citizens and Legal Immigration Act, H.R. 100, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005), reviewed by Am. 
Immgr. Lawyers Ass’n., A Sad Day for America, H.R. 418 Is Fatally Flawed: The Senate Needs to 
Repudiate it and Focus on Comprehensive Immigration Reform, Feb. 11, 2005, 
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=12332. 
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shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it.”202  The habeas writ has not been suspended since the Civil War.203  The 
House sent the REAL ID Act to the Senate, moreover, as part of a “must pass” 
appropriations measure for the war in Iraq and tsunami relief.204  Title I of the final 
version, more obviously, is titled “Amendments to Federal Laws to Protect Against 
Terrorist Entry.”205  The REAL ID Act, ostensibly, was making someone look tough. 
¶55 What the Act does little to contemplate, however, is what it contributes to pre-
existing laws that already bar terrorists from entry.206  By increasing immigration judges’ 
discretion to grant or deny asylum regardless of the record as a whole, and by failing to 
address increasingly obvious procedural deficiencies, the REAL ID Act diminishes the 
reliability of the asylum system by blurring its standards.  Such a system may well result 
in fewer successful asylum applications, but the aggregate decrease has no discernable 
relationship to terrorism.207  A hasty immigration judge, in fact, may use the REAL ID 
Act’s endorsement of unreviewable discretion to admit more asylum seekers by relying 
on such factors as demeanor and State Department reports, instead of an individualized 
assessment of the record.208 
¶56 The problem with these reforms is perspective—they presume that the problems 
stem from asylum applicants themselves and thereby are blind to real systemic 
deficiencies.  A more reliable approach would be to increase the resources of the 
immigration courts and set down solid evidentiary rules that require careful and 
particularized consideration of the facts.  These requirements could then be ensured by 
restoring meaningful administrative and judicial review.  Whatever the specific reforms 
may be, they must recognize that the procedural problems are real.  
B. The Second Step: Applying a Solution 
¶57 Of the most frustrating aspects of the regression of U.S. asylum procedural law is 
the available-but-ignored wealth of solutions.  Solutions do exist—indeed, they are 
abundant.  Professor Peter Margulies, for example, offers a multifaceted “dynamic view” 
                                                 
202 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2, reviewed by INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).  
203 Am. Immgr. Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 201. 
204 ACLU Urges Congress to Remove “Real ID” From Funding Measure; Proposal Attacks the Persecuted, 
Harms Immigrants, Apr. 26, 2005, http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=18112&c=206. 
205 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-12, 119 Stat. 231, tit. I (2005). 
206 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (2000) (aliens who fall under the broad statutory definition of “terrorist” are 
inadmissible); see generally Nat’l Immigration Forum, Real ID Act of 2005 (H.R. 418), LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYSIS, May 4, 2005, http://www.immigrationforum.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=701#Info. 
207 See supra Part II.B.ii (noting that the REAL ID Act’s “central reason” requirement presents a daunting 
obstacle to all asylum applicants regardless of the merit of their claims). 
208 See, e.g., In re Hong Phuoc Nguyen, No. A44233829, 2005 WL 3802171 (BIA Dec. 6, 2005).  The 
decision is by no means incorrect, but illustrates the discretionary latitude immigration judges may exercise 
in overcoming BIA review.  The BIA, in an unpublished opinion, held: 
The Immigration Judge found that the respondent provided credible testimony establishing that he suffered 
past persecution in Vietnam.  The Immigration Judge also found that conditions in Vietnam for persons 
such as the respondent have not changed so substantially that the respondent no longer has a fear of 
returning.  On this record, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that the Immigration Judge’s 
finding is clearly erroneous.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2005); United States v. United States Gypsum 
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).  Thus, we decline to set aside the Immigration Judge’s finding that the 
respondent sustained the burden of proof applicable to withholding of removal. 
Id.
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of evaluating legislative and adjudicative facts in asylum proceedings.209  While 
Margulies’s approach specifically addresses the issue of country conditions, his theory is 
well-suited as a comprehensive reorientation of factfinding.  The approach would require 
the immigration judge to carefully analyze “on the ground” conditions relevant to the 
asylum seeker’s claim by applying four elements: 
 
a) [P]lacing the burden of proof on changed country conditions on the 
[immigration agency] in all cases, not merely those involving proven 
instances of past persecution; b) requiring specific findings of fact by 
adjudicators regarding the crucial elements of institutional repertoire, 
inclusiveness, and redress; c) requiring independent authority, beyond 
State Department reports, to justify a finding of changed country 
conditions; and d) requiring the Immigration Judge to conduct the asylum 
hearing fairly, specifically by allowing the asylum-seeker an opportunity 
to tell her story.210
 
¶58 The first of these requirements would not only cease the logically problematic 
distinction between cases of past persecution and future persecution,211 but would also 
reflect a more realistic balancing of the applicant’s and government’s roles.  Requiring an 
asylum seeker to prove unchanged country conditions, despite credible personal 
testimony, puts a heavy burden on the applicant that arguably exceeds both international 
and U.S. standards.212  More practically, the government generally has better resources 
than the applicant to provide legislative facts.213  Requiring the government to bear the 
burden of proof with regards to legislative country conditions evidence would be more 
consistent with the roles of the applicant and government in asylum proceedings.214 
¶59 The second requirement of specific factfinding ensures that immigration judges 
must base their decisions on evidence on the record, rather than speculation or 
conjecture.215  While Margulies’s three factors of institutional repertoire, inclusion, and 
redress, need not necessarily be exclusive, they lay an important foundation.216  
Experience has proven that immigration judges, unfortunately, do not always produce 
carefully measured asylum decisions.217  By establishing specific and meticulous 
factfinding standards, deficient decisions may and will be overturned—rather than rubber 
stamped—upon review. 
                                                 
209 Margulies, supra note 21, at 35. 
210 Id. 
211 See id. at 35-36 (illustrating how past persecution, as a matter of chance, becomes a windfall to asylum 
applicants—while those who acted upon their well-founded fear and evaded persecution enjoy no such 
advantage). 
212 See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (noting, among other things, that “a genuine refugee does 
not flee her native country armed with affidavits, expert witnesses, and extensive documentation”) 
Abankwah v. I.N.S, 185 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir. 1999). 
213 Id. 
214 See id. 
215 See Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 324 (3d Cir 2004). 
216 For a fuller discussion of these factors and their inclusion in the “dynamic approach,” see Margulies, 
supra note 21, at 35. 
217 See generally supra Part II.B. 
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¶60 Margulies’s final two requirements help enforce the immigration judge’s 
factfinding obligations by rooting out two common problems directly.  Under 
Margulies’s third requirement, rote citation to State Department reports would be 
declared per se insufficient.218  Margulies would not declare that State Department reports 
are necessarily unreliable; rather, Margulies would only require that their assertions be 
checked against other available independent sources.219  While the State Department’s 
report would be heeded, the asylum applicant would be appropriately safeguarded against 
hasty judicial abdication to them. 
¶61 Fourth and finally, Margulies would require that the immigration judge grant the 
applicant an adequate opportunity to tell his or her story.220  As reviewed supra Part 
II.B.3, complaints of plainly unprofessional conduct by immigration judges have 
increased dramatically.221  By adopting conduct-specific requirements, inappropriate 
conduct would cease to slip by the lax standard of review afforded asylum decisions.222  
Such an assurance is of great importance not only to the fidelity of the administrative 
process, but also to the overwhelmed asylum seeker.223 
¶62 These are not radical ideas.  Traditional asylum law already imposes an evidentiary 
“duty to inquire”224 on immigration courts, which “reflects the government’s obligation to 
place justice and international refugee law ahead of adversarial proclivities.”225  Under 
this duty, the government and the court are obligated to assist in fully developing the 
factual record.226  Codifying the elements proposed by Margulies would merely force the 
immigration judge to fulfill his or her role as originally conceived.227  The BIA and 
federal courts could then apply these same elements upon review to assure that asylum 
determinations are adequately thorough. 
¶63 Another writer’s approach would more clearly delineate “legislative and 
adjudicatory” facts,228 require particularized and “on the ground” assessment of country 
conditions, and relax the standard of judicial review so that federal courts may reverse 
decisions that rest on “faulty assumptions or factual foundations.”229  The first two 
proposals are essentially repackaged versions of Professor Margulies’s factors;230 the last 
proposal, however, goes beyond Margulies’s model.  Affording the federal courts a less 
                                                 
218 See Margulies, supra note 21, at 39-40. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 40. 
221 See, e.g., Garrovillas v. INS, 156 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Throughout the proceedings, the 
[immigration judge] acted with impatience and hostility towards Garrovillas, bullying and haranguing him 
from the inception of the hearing to its conclusion.”). 
222 See supra Part II.C. 
223 See 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 34.02(9)(A) (“[A]sylum applicants may be mistrustful or 
apprehensive of U.S. authorities, given the experiences that cause them to flee, so they may have difficulty 
speaking freely or giving full accounts of their cases.”). 
224 See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1, 42 (1992). 
225 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 11, § 34.02; supra Part II.B.ii. 
226 See sources cited id. 
227 See In re A-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1106, 1126-27 (BIA 1998) (Rosenberg, J., dissenting) (lamenting the 
substantial abandonment of this principle). 
228 Kerns, supra note 21, at 216; Martin, supra note 42, at 1280-85. 
229 Kerns, supra note 21, at 220. 
230 Compare, e.g., Kerns, supra note 21, at 219 (noting “the country of origin’s power structure,” among 
other things, as a necessary element of an “on the ground” factual assessment), with Margulies, supra note 
21, at 37-38 (discussing “institutional repertoire” as a necessary element of specific factual findings). 
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deferential standard of review would help remedy the widespread lack of confidence they 
express in the administrative record of asylum determinations.231  While statutorily 
codifying Margulies’s recommendations would substantially accomplish the same effect, 
reinforcing this approach with heightened review would directly restore the system’s 
accountability. 
¶64 BIA and federal appeals court policy on taking notice of country conditions, 
moreover, ought not to continue in diverging confusion.  One possible solution, as 
advocated by Katherine Strandburg, would be to grant motions to re-open as of right, 
transforming them into a mechanism whereby the asylum applicant would be assured an 
opportunity to rebut administrative notice of changed country conditions.232  Reviewing 
courts would be afforded the opportunity to draw from contemporary country reports by 
taking notice, and the asylum applicant would be guaranteed an opportunity to challenge 
the reports if he or she desired.233  Such an approach would not solve deficiencies at the 
initial asylum hearing, but they would do much to rectify the false pretense that 
reviewing courts are deciding upon a complete administrative record.  What problems 
exist at the initial hearing, moreover, could be resolved by resorting to the previous 
proposals discussed herein. 
C. A New Perspective: Considering the Proposals in Whole 
¶65 Common among these proposals is a recognition that sincere asylum reform ought 
to focus on effectively discerning between meritorious and non-meritorious claims.  What 
is less important is whether the asylum system simply admits more or less applicants as 
an aggregate whole.  Unfortunately, this latter consideration appears to be the one 
Congress has seized upon.  While the federal courts complain of administrative records 
so deficient that they are in practice outright meaningless,234 Congress unfortunately 
responds by relaxing evidentiary standards and reducing judicial review.  Legislation 
being considered on the eve of this paper’s submission, moreover, affirms and continues 
this trend.235  Clearly, something is amiss.  Before effective asylum reform can occur a 
new legislative perspective is necessary.236 
                                                 
231 See supra Part II.C.ii. 
232 Strandburg, supra note 110, at 71-82.  Strandburg’s approach has already been adopted by the Fifth 
Circuit.  See Wondimu v. Ashcroft, 48 Fed. Appx. 102, 2002 WL 31016464, at *5 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(unpublished decision) (citing Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 968 (5th Cir. 1991)).  The Fifth Circuit 
noted, however, that without statutory guidance this approach rests on the precarious good-faith of the 
immigration agency.  Id. at 968 n.5. 
233 Strangburg’s argument concerned specifically administrative notice at the BIA, but her logic seems 
equally relevant to federal judicial notice.  See, e.g., Pelinkovic v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 532, 540-41 (7th Cir. 
2004) (taking post-BIA determination notice of changed country conditions). 
234 See Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 331 (3d Cir. 2004). 
235 Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. 
§§ 801-08 (2d Sess. 2005) [hereinafter Border Protection] (addressing perceived “Immigration Litigation 
Abuse,” by, among other things, reducing judicial review); but see Editorial, The Gospel vs. H.R. 4437, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at A1.  The editorial reads, in part:  
It has been a long time since this country heard a call to organized lawbreaking on this big a scale.  
Cardinal Roger Mahony of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Los Angeles, the nation’s largest, urged 
parishioners on Ash Wednesday to devote the 40 days of Lent to fasting, prayer and reflection on the need 
for humane reform of immigration laws.  If current efforts in Congress make it a felony to shield or offer 
support to illegal immigrants, Cardinal Mahony said, he will instruct his priests—and faithful lay 
Catholics—to defy the law. . . . 
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¶66 Once the faults of the procedural system emerge from the bloodshot haze of 9/11, 
however, necessary reform should become clear.  First, meaningful review must be 
restored to both the BIA and the federal courts.  The reforms of 2002 discussed herein, 
including streamlining, are now obvious failures.  In promulgating streamlining, Attorney 
General Ashcroft expressly declined waiting for the results of a Congressional study and 
instead cursorily observed that preliminary forms of streamlining yielded only a 0.7% 
federal remand rate.237  In the past year, the Seventh Circuit reversed 48% of appeals 
from the BIA.238  We now know that Ashcroft was wrong, that the reforms of 2002 are a 
failure,239 and we ought not dwell on it further.  Restoring confidence in the U.S. asylum 
system must begin by casting aside these disasters and replacing them with review that 
ensures that errors will not be tolerated. 
¶67 Once meaningful review has returned to the courts, an evidentiary system with 
meaningful standards may be contemplated.  The substance of these standards is 
secondary; what is most important is that immigration judges and the BIA are subject to 
explicit procedural rules that guide their decisionmaking and thereby also provide 
standards for review.  The proposals reviewed herein are informative.  Margulies’s 
reforms would correct many of the deficiencies in initial asylum hearings, while 
Strandburg’s reforms would provide appellate courts the means to conduct meaningful 
review.  These reforms need not be the beginning or the end of reforming the asylum 
process.  Margulies’s quite specific factfinding proposals,240 for example, provide a 
framework that need not be adopted wholesale to effectuate their purpose.  None of the 
proposals, further, address the evidentiary infirmities of expedited removal.  What they 
do offer, however, is a reliable administrative structure that reflects the underpinnings of 
refugee law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶68 This paper set out to identify the procedural deficiencies of American asylum 
adjudication, and offer perspective for reform.  It is, however, an incomplete story.  
Future legislators, advocates, judges, and writers bear the burden of seeing reform 
effectuated.  In order for that chapter to begin, a new perspective is necessary.  Reform 
must look past individual instances of error and instead consider how the system’s very 
structure has failed. 
                                                                                                                                                 
. . . . 
 Cardinal Mahony’s declaration of solidarity with illegal immigrants, for whom Lent is every day, is a 
startling call to civil disobedience, as courageous as it is timely.  We hope it forestalls the day when works 
of mercy become a federal crime. 
Id. 
236 Admittedly, however, attempts to shift legislative perspective have already been unsuccessfully made.  
See, e.g., Martin, supra note 42 (offering a comprehensively overhauled approach to asylum law). 
237 Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 
(Aug. 26, 2002) (stating that the Department does not have “the luxury of waiting for the results of such a 
study”). 
238 MacLean, Immigration Bench, supra note 6, at 18. 
239 See supra notes 123-131 and accompanying text. 
240 See Margulies supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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¶69 Whether the political climate is ripe for such a shift is questionable.  In Congress 
today, xenophobia is unmistakable.241  “Xenophobia,” of course, is only the newest 
politically correct euphemism for racism.242  Attorney General Alberto Gonzales’s reform 
directives to the immigration courts, however, appear generally to be a step in the right 
direction.  The judiciary, finally, is well ahead of the curve in its incisive critiques of the 
immigration courts.  How the immigration courts decide to apply the REAL ID Act is 
also unclear.  When INS v. Elias-Zacarias seemingly sounded the death-knell of the 
doctrine of imputed political opinion,243 for example, the BIA nonetheless found enough 
exceptions in the Supreme Court’s opinion to safely revive the doctrine.244  An 
assessment of the effects of the REAL ID Act on asylum proceedings may similarly be 
premature. 
¶70 Reform will also cost money.  There is no question that restoring meaningful 
adjudicative process to the U.S. asylum system also requires meaningful funding, which 
is always a four letter word in political discussions of immigration.245  The 2002 
streamlining reforms and BIA reduction, however, have done the government no favor.  
Not only do they destroy the immigration agency’s ability to take its job seriously, they 
also cost money by institutionalizing inefficiency through endless loops of litigation.246  
Eleven BIA judges deciding 48,000 cases per year simply defies all notions of common 
sense, although it does inspire sympathy.247  In the end, Congress must admit that 
readiness to take immigration seriously means readiness to commit adequate resources. 
¶71 All the meanwhile, however, refugees wait in detention centers and prison cells 
across the United States.  They appear before immigration judges who may or may not 
abuse them, depending on their luck.  They appeal to phantom administrative bodies from 
whom they never see nor hear.  They await appeal before federal courts that have 
minimal authority to help them.  They fear persecution and death upon removal.  The 
Wonderland they know was not familiar to Alice. 
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